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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a simple model to show how social insurance affects the 
desire to revolt against property rights. It then tests for the effect of social 
insurance on revolt by introducing a panel data set derived from surveys 
across over 200,000 randomly sampled individuals from the 1970s to the 
1990s. After controlling for the personal characteristics of respondents, 
country fixed effects, year dummies, as well as country-specific time trends, 
less people are found to support revolt when the generosity of either the 
elderly person’s social security or unemployment benefits increases. A one 
standard deviation change in either variable explains approximately one 
standard deviation of the proportion of people supporting revolt, measured 
across the countries and years in the sample. The personal characteristic with 
the largest effect on reducing revolutionary support is being religious. 
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1.  Introduction 
The existence of social insurance is often justified by economists on the grounds of its 
risk-management function, the risk that some random turn of events will leave a worker 
unemployed or elderly people impoverished. However the historical origins of social 
insurance owed more to the objective of increasing the security of property rights. 
Cementing these rights lay the cornerstone for the market economies of the future. A 
frequently cited example is the first mandatory, old-age pension system created in 
Germany in 1889. Otto von Bismark,“its sponsor and thus the founder of modern old-age social 
security, was neither a reformer nor particularly liberal. The ‘iron-chancellor’ advocated social security in 
the hope of pacifying the proletariat and luring them away from socialism”.1 I test for the effect of 
social insurance on rebellion using a survey data set with over 200,000 randomly 
sampled individuals from the 1970s to the 1990s. Two types of social insurance are 
studied: social security for elderly people and unemployment insurance. The data also 
help answer the old question of whether religion is the opium of the masses. The 
empirics are based on a choice-theoretic model that shows how the results may have 
fundamental implications for the design of the optimal welfare state. 
 
The paper lies at the junction of two literatures, one on rebellion against property rights 
and the other on social insurance. The way in which force can be used to serve one’s 
interests has a long and distinguished history in the economics literature. Karl Marx’s 
(1887) Das Kapital opened the question of whether market economies could be 
sustained or would meet their end in the violent appropriation by workers of capitalists’ 
property. Schelling (1960) studied conflicts between nations and Olson (1965) dealt 
with problems of collective action and special interest groups.2 A recent resurgence of 
attention has seen a number of papers seeking to extend general economic equilibrium 
to allow for conflict over property rights in models where resources can be allocated 
                                                 
1 See pp40-41 of Carter and Shipman (1997). 
1 
2 See also Haavelmo (1954), Tullock (1974) and Schumpeter (1991). 
between productive and appropriative activities. These include Grossman (1991, 1994), 
Hirshleifer (1995), Skaperdas (1992) and Grossman and Kim (1995). An equilibrium 
income distribution arising solely under threats of force, rather than markets, is derived 
in Usher and Engineer (1987). Roemer (1998) studies the political economy of revolt, 
showing how the rich may avoid losing wealth to the majority poor if voters have a 
preference over a non-economic issue, like religion, in a two dimensional voting game. 
Kuran (1991) and Lohmann (1994) show how small scale protest activity can trigger a 
cascade of more protests that lead to the incumbent regime’s collapse.3 
 
Empirical papers on rebellion are less common in economics. Durham et al (1998) use 
experimental evidence to study when an initially poor party is able to improve its wealth 
relative to a richer opponent in a game where resources can be divided between 
productive and appropriative efforts. Benabou (1996) surveys literature on the effect of 
inequality on political stability. This topic has been of particular interest since political 
uncertainty may in turn affect investment and growth.4 Empirical papers explaining 
rebellion are more common in political science where economic variables have been 
added in regressions to test “economic discontent” theories. These include the idea that 
people feel relatively deprived if they get less than what they think they deserve and the 
Marxist view that exploitation leads to “immiseration” of the working class.5 As an 
example, Gurr and Moore (1997) study the causes on ethno-political violence in the 
                                                 
3 Other papers and books by these authors include Roemer (1985), Hirshleifer (1991), Skaperdas (1991), 
Grossman (1999) and Garfinkel and Skaperdas (1996). Acemoglu and Robinson (1999) model how political 
transitions between democracy and autocracy may depend on the level of inequality. A related literature on the 
economics of crime has its roots in Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970) and another on corruption begins with 
Rose-Ackerman (1975).  
4 See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1996), Alesina, Özler, Roubini and Swagel (1996) and Perotti (1996). 
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5 Although these theories predict a positive effect of income inequality on revolt, empirical studies have given 
contradictory results (see Gurr (1970), Muller (1985) and Lichbach (1989) for a review). This may be due to 
biases caused by omitted fixed effects because panel data have not been used and also the difficulty of 
obtaining good  measures of inequality. Another strand of literature seeks to explain revolts by the political 
processes that provide opportunities for mobilized dissidents to challenge the State (see Tarrow (1989), 
Francisco (1993)). 
1980s. A virtue of the paper is its use of a global data set but the cross-sectional 
evidence does not control for unobserved fixed effects. 
 
Turning to papers on the economics of social insurance, these have typically ignored 
the insecurity of property rights. Hubbard and Judd (1987) and Imrohoroglu et al 
(1995) defend the need for social security for the elderly as insurance against uncertain 
lifetimes and individual income risk with incomplete markets. Shiller (1998) offers a 
good description of how social security can help manage risks within and between 
generations, as well as across nations. Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) motivated 
its need in a general equilibrium setting as a way of moving the economy from an 
inefficient equilibrium, characterized by over-accumulation of capital, to an efficient 
equilibrium by decreasing savings. Whether social security actually does decrease private 
savings is an old controversy.6 Positive theories include Tabellini (1991) and Cooley and 
Soares (1999). By contrast the literature on unemployment insurance (UI) started by 
Feldstein (1976), Baily (1978) and Shavell and Weiss (1979) has studied the trade-off 
between the benefits of more insurance and the potential moral hazard problems 
arising from more temporary layoffs and less job search. In Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) 
higher UI induces greater shirking by workers. Important empirical papers on the 
adverse incentive effects of UI include Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976), Feldstein (1978) 
and Nickell (1979).7 Positive theories include Wright (1986) and Atkinson (1990).8 In 
summary the bulk of the literature has focused on the benefits and costs that social 
insurance brings society by managing its risks and by affecting behavior such as the 
desire to save, join the labor force, shirk on the job or search for new work. Property 
rights have been implicitly assumed secure. 
 
                                                 
6 Early papers are Barro (1974) and Feldstein (1974, 1996). 
7 Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) provides a detailed summary of this literature. 
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8 The empirical determinants of unemployment benefits have been tested in Di Tella and MacCulloch (2000). 
This paper begins with a simple model that combines insecurity of property rights in an 
economy where risk-averse individuals also receive social insurance to protect them 
against an unlucky turn of events.9 The model shows how the welfare state may be a 
particularly powerful instrument for crowding out revolutionary efforts in society. The 
extent of the crowding out becomes an important empirical question and forms the 
focus of the paper. A large survey data set is used in which people are asked directly 
whether or not they support revolt. These data form our proxy for the level of rebellion 
in society. Their use is partly motivated by the great difficulty in obtaining objective 
measures of this variable. In addition the panel dimension of the data set covering 12 
countries across nearly two decades has the advantage of letting us control for 
unobserved fixed effects. Knowing peoples’ personal characteristics also turns out to be 
key since they mould revolutionary support, in the case of religion, at least as much as 
the economic variables. 
 
In Section 2 the model is outlined. Section 3 describes the data and strategy used in the 
empirical part. Section 4 describes the main results. Section 5 provides some extra 
checks and tests on the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
9 Sala-i-Martin (1997) shows how social safety nets can be used to bribe poor people out of revolt in a model 
with risk-neutral individuals. Hence there is no insurance demand for transfers in his economy. 
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2.  A Simple Model of Revolt 
In this section, a model of rebellion against ownership claims to property is developed. 
The purpose is simply to outline one mechanism through which potential appropriation 
of wealth via a revolt may depend on the generosity of the welfare state. 
 
2. 1.  The Rebel’s Problem 
Assume that individuals have the separable utility function, U(i,e)=U(i)-c(e), where i is 
income, e is the effort exerted on revolt, U´(i)>0 and U´´(i)<0. Each person may find 
him or herself lucky with probability, 1-u, in which case she earns income, Y, or unlucky 
with probability, u, in which case she receives Government transfers of size, b, where 
b∈[0,Y]. Without loss of generality, normalize Y=1. Let the population be large which 
means that the proportion of lucky individuals equals 1-u and the proportion of unlucky 
individuals equals u. Assume that private insurance markets do not exist.10 Having 
received the Government transfer, an unlucky individual can decide to devote a 
proportion of his or her spare time to putting effort, e, into revolt where e∈[0,1]. In the 
event that the revolt is successful, such a person appropriates pe from the income of 
lucky people where p∈[0,1].11 The cost of effort to the individual is ce. Assume that the 
marginal cost of each rebel’s efforts, c, differs across different rebels.12 Let its 
probability density function be f(c) with support [0,c*]. Assume that the probability of a 
successful revolt, π, depends on the average level of rebel effort, ē, exerted across the 
                                                 
10 Empirically, assuming that private markets for UI do not exist seems plausible. Chiu and Karni (1998) state 
that “unemployment insurance is unique in that unlike other forms of insurance it has never been provided by the private sector” 
(see also Oswald (1986)). Consequently the assumption of no private UI has been widely made (see, inter alia, 
Bailey (1978), Azariadis (1975), Wright (1986)). Chiu and Karni (1998) observe that private UI was not even 
offered when there was no public sector UI. Hence they argue that a fundamental problem, such as moral 
hazard, is needed to explain the near-universal absence of private UI (rather than just crowding out by the 
public sector). 
11 The assumption of linearity is made for simplicity but can be easily generalized to a more general functional 
form, p(e) where p´(e)>0 and p´´(e)≤0. 
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12 The marginal cost of revolt is assumed to be exogenous. Optimal punishment regimes that endogenize this 
variable have already been studied in the literature, originally by Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970). 
whole population: π=Π(ē) where Π′(ē)≥0 and Π′′(ē)≤0. Hence π is exogenous for each 
individual rebel. 
 
The problem for each unlucky individual is to choose his or her effort on rebellion with 
the objective to maximize expected utility:13 
 
cebUpebUe     -    )()1(        )(  max ππ −++         (1) 
 
Let the optimal level of effort that solves this problem be called e(b,c). This is a function 
of the level of transfers chosen by the Government as well as each rebel’s marginal cost 
of effort. The First Order Condition (FOC) is: 
 
0            -    )( =+′ cpebUpπ          (2) 
 
Hence the optimal level of effort (for interior solutions) is e(b,c)=[(U´)-1(c/pπ)-b]/p. 
Corner solutions also exist where e(b,c)=0 or e(b,c)=1. No effort is made to rebel by all 
those individuals for whom c>pπU′(b). For such people, the marginal cost of their 
appropriative efforts is always greater than the marginal gain from these efforts. The 
proportion of unlucky individuals for whom e(b,c)=0 is v(b)= . On the other 
hand, those individuals for whom c<pπU′(b+p) devote their full available effort on 
revolt. The proportion of unlucky individuals for whom e(b,c)=1 is w(b)= . 
∫∞
′ )(
)(           
bUp
dccf
π
∫ +′ )(0 )(                   pbUp dccfπ
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13 This formulation makes two assumptions. The first is that the proceeds received by an individual in the event 
of a successful revolt are proportional to the effort that she has contributed to achieving it. The second 
assumption is that rebels can obtain more income from the lucky people in the event of a successful revolt the 
higher the average level of effort being exerted across the population to achieve the revolt. In other words the 
“booty” is not necessarily fixed. If the booty were fixed, we would have to specify the income received by each 
rebel from appropriate activities as being a function of e/ē (see, for example, Grossman (1991)). 
2. 2.  The Equilibrium 
In the equilibrium each rebel chooses effort determined by the solution to problem (1) 
where the probability of a successful revolt must satisfy: 
 
∫∞Π= 0 ))(),((      dccfcbeuπ          (3) 
 
where ē=u  is the average level of rebel effort in the economy. To characterize 
the equilibrium we study separately two cases, the first one where Π′(ē)=0 and the 
second one where Π′(ē)>0. For interior solutions the following results are obtained. 
∫∞0 )(),( dccfcbe
 
Theorem 1 (One-for-One Crowding Out): If Π′(ē)=0 then increases in Government 
transfers crowd out the income appropriated in the event of a successful revolt one-for-
one: 
1-       ),( =′ cbep b            (4) 
 
Proof: The FOC is pπU´(b+pe)-c=0. Solving for the income appropriated in the event of 
a successful revolt yields pe(b,c)=(U´)-1(c/pπ)-b. Differentiating with respect to b gives 
peb´(b,c)=-1.    # 
 
The reason for this result is that the marginal gain from spending effort on revolt is a 
function of the total income received by each rebel from both the Government and 
appropriative activities. Hence increases in Government transfers must be offset one-
for-one by decreases in income from appropriative activities to keep the marginal gain 
the same and maintain the equilibrium. 
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A rise in Government transfers can also have other effects when corner solutions exist. 
First, it increases the proportion of individuals who exert no effort to appropriate 
others’ income: p0′(b)=-pπU′′(b)f(pπU´(b)) >0. Second, it decreases the proportion of 
individuals who devote their full available effort on revolt: p1′(b)= 
pπU′′(b+p)f(pπU´(b+p))<0. For the surviving group of full-time rebels, increases in 
transfers have no effect since both before and after the increase, e(b,c)=1. 
 
To study the more difficult second case where Π′(ē)>0, we put a bit more structure on 
the problem. 
 
Theorem 2 (More than One-for-One Crowding Out): Assume that Π′(ē)>0 and 
people have the same marginal cost of revolt. Increases in Government transfers that 
reduce rebel effort crowd out the income appropriated in the event of a successful 
revolt more than one-for-one: 
 
1-       ),( <′ cbep b            (5) 
 
Proof: If people have the same marginal cost of revolt then π=Π =Π(ue(b,c)). 
In equilibrium the two conditions, π=Π(ue(b,c)) and pe(b,c)=(U´)
∫∞0 ))(),(( dccfcbeu
-1(c/pπ)-b, must both be 
satisfied. Substituting the former into the latter and differentiating with respect to b 
gives peb´(b,c)=-(uc/pπ2)Π′(ē)eb´(b,c)V´(c/pπ)-1 where V=(U´)-1. But V´(c/pπ)<0 since 
U(.) is a concave function, Π′(ē)>0 by assumption and eb´(b,c)<0 when Government 
transfers reduce rebel effort. Hence peb´(b,c)<-1.    # 
 
An increase in Government transfers now has two separate effects. First it increases the 
total income received by each rebel which reduces the marginal gain from spending 
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effort on revolt. A decrease in rebel effort that results in a one-for-one reduction in 
income from appropriative activities is able to offset this effect (as in the previous case). 
However there is now a second effect, due to the fall in the average level of rebel effort 
across the population which reduces the probability of the revolt being successful. This 
reduces the expected marginal return to each individual from rebel effort and leads to a 
further reduction in effort and income from appropriative activities. These two effects 
produce the result that income appropriated in the event of a successful revolt 
decreases by more than one-for-one when Government transfers increase. 
 
Consequently an important empirical question is the actual extent to which more 
generous transfers crowd out revolt. The result in Theorem 2 suggests the welfare 
state’s potential of being a particularly powerful policy instrument for this purpose. The 
following sections of the paper attempt to estimate the size and significance of the 
effect. 
 
3.  The data 
Our challenge is to obtain a measure of the effort being made to revolt that is also 
comparable across countries and time so that we can exploit a panel dimension to the 
data. One approach is to use measures of protests and violent forms of civil 
disobedience. A disadvantage of such measures is that they may not capture the 
underlying level of support for revolt and the corresponding effort being made by 
rebels to effect an alteration of the existing system of property rights and taxation. 
Another problem is that there are many different such indirect measures which could 
potentially be used (such as the number of acts of sabotage, rallies and terrorism) 
making it difficult to choose between them. Events such as political strikes are hard to 
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classify.14 
 
In this paper we take an alternative approach and use direct evidence from surveys of 
revolutionary support. In other words we “let the polls decide”. In the next sub-section 
the data are described, as well as some of the advantages and disadvantages of the use 
of subjective data. Sub-section 3.2. outlines the empirical strategy taken in the paper. 
 
3. 1.  Description 
The source of the data on revolt is the Euro-Barometer Survey Series (1976-1990) 
which interviews a random sample of 200,547 Europeans in 12 nations over a 15 year 
period. One question asks: “On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-a-vis the society in 
which we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion (One Answer Only)”. 
The three relevant response categories are: “The entire way our society is organised must be 
radically changed by revolutionary action”, “Our society must be gradually improved by reforms”, and 
“Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces” (The “Don't know” and 
“Not asked in this survey” categories are not included in our data set). The Appendix 
provides a summary of this survey. 
 
There are advantages and disadvantages to the use of subjective survey data. An 
advantage is that individual responses give a direct measure of the level of support for 
revolt that actually exists in nations. It overcomes several of the disadvantages 
associated with objective measures (like protests) discussed above. One disadvantage is 
that the responses may be untruthful.15 However micro-econometric equations of the 
                                                 
14 Francisco (1993) uses person-days of protest per 100,000 persons per week, noting that “most empirical 
studies of protest and revolution use other measures, especially political deaths”. 
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15 An issue raised in the psychology literature is that subjects’ survey responses may be influenced by what they 
believe to be the socially desirable response. If the social norm is not to support revolt, subjects may bias their 
response towards maintaining the status quo. Since the first studies in the area, psychologists have found 
evidence that this concern may be exaggerated (e.g. Rorer (1965), Bradburn (1969)). Moreover at least part of 
the influence of social norms can be controlled for in the empirical specifications later on. 
support for revolt regressed on the respondent’s personal characteristics do have a 
similar structure across nations (see MacCulloch (1999)). For example, in every one of 
the 12 nations in the Euro-Barometer Survey, being in a lower income quartile 
monotonically increases the chance of supporting revolt. In 10 of the 12 nations 
studied, being unemployed increases the chances of supporting revolt. Men are more 
likely to support revolt whereas married people are less likely to support revolt in all the 
nations. These results would not be expected if the survey responses were random.16 
 
Another disadvantage may be that although a person says they support revolt, they may 
not actually be exerting costly effort to achieve one. The proxy works to the extent that 
the proportion of individuals in a country who state they desire revolt is positively 
correlated with the efforts being devoted to the cause. The survey response categories 
also force respondents to make a discrete choice (you must either declare yourself in 
favor of revolt or not) whereas in practice different individuals can spend different 
levels of continuous effort on revolt. The simplest way to interpret the response 
choices is to assume that individuals say they support revolt provided they are exerting 
effort on revolt greater than some cut-off value, eS. In other words the unobservable 
rebel effort variable, e(b,c), from the model in Section 2 can be interpreted as being  the 
underlying continuous variable from which the observable discrete survey choices are 
generated. The proportion of the population for which e>eS is: 
 
∫ +′= )(0 )(     )(
SpebUp
dccfubS
π          (6) 
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16 The effect of other personal characteristics is more ambiguous. Whereas a British higher education decreases 
support for revolt, a French higher education increases it, both significant at the 1 per cent level. Overall, a 
higher education after leaving school decreases revolutionary support in six countries and increases it in the 
other six. The effect of personal characteristics on the desire for revolt across the 51,793 individuals from 37 
countries sampled in 1981 and 1990 as part of the World Values Survey is similar to the Euro-Barometer 
Survey results for income, employment status, sex and marital status. 
As the generosity of Government transfers increases, the proportion of individuals who 
say they support revolt varies according to: 
 
0      ))(()(     )( ≤+′+′′=′ SS pebUpfpebUupbS ππ         (7) 
 
It is this number that we seek to estimate in the subsequent regressions. 
 
Table 1.1 shows the proportions of individuals who desire revolutionary action, versus 
those who do not (i.e. the ones who desire either gradual reforms or the present society 
valiantly defended) for the entire sample, the unemployed, manual workers, religious 
persons, partisan self-placement (left or right) and income quartile. There are 200,547 
Euro-Barometer survey respondents, covering people living in 12 nations between 1976 
and 1990. Of the whole sample, 6.0 per cent desire revolution. Of the sub-sample of 
unemployed people, 9.9 per cent desire revolt. Of male respondents, 6.8 per cent desire 
revolt compared with 5.1 per cent of females. As we proceed from the lowest to the 
highest income quartiles, there is a monotonically decreasing proportion of responses in 
favour of revolution, the biggest jump occurring between the 2nd and 3rd income 
quartiles (from 6.6 per cent to 5.7 per cent, respectively). Within each country the 
highest level of revolutionary support was in Portugal, which fell from 14.3 per cent in 
1985 to 6.0 per cent in 1986. After the “Revolution of the Carnations” on 25 April 
1974, Portugal experienced extreme political swings and strikes until entry into the 
European Community in 1986 secured a measure of stability.17 The lowest average level 
of revolutionary support was 2.3 per cent in Denmark.18 
                                                 
17 The subsequent regression results are unaffected by the omission of Portugal. 
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18 Although a small number, Kuran (1991) shows how ‘revolutionary bandwagons’ can lead to small events 
creating large sudden increases in the scale of revolutionary support. For example if one person has a bad 
experience that increases his alienation from the State and drives him to revolt, this may trigger another 
defection from a person who sees that there is now more opposition and fewer hostile State supporters to be 
faced. This process may generate explosive growth in rebel numbers from an initially small base, until even 
 Two measures of the generosity of social insurance are used in the subsequent 
regressions. The first, SOCIAL SECURITY, is the level of transfer payments made by 
the Government primarily to retired elderly persons as a proportion of GDP.19 The 
second, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS, is the latest summary measure of the 
parameters of the unemployment benefit system. This measure was compiled by the 
OECD Jobs Study (1994) and is the pre-tax average of 18 replacement ratios (for two 
earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment).20 For 
further information about these variables, see the Data Definitions in the Appendix. 
 
3. 2.  Empirical Strategy 
We relate the support for revolt across 12 European countries to the generosity of their 
social insurance schemes, other macroeconomic variables and several individual 
characteristics. Formally, linear approximations of equation (6) are estimated. The 
particular schemes are the social security for elderly people and the unemployment 
insurance. We take advantage of both the cross-country and time series variation in the 
generosity of these programs. The probit regressions are of the form: 
 
 
SUPPORT REVOLTictg = α g SOCIAL SECURITYct + β g UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITSct 
       + γ g MACROct + δ g MICROictg + ηcg + µtg + λcg t + εictg     (8) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
people who had previously strongly defended the State join the revolt as they fear hostility from the rebels if 
they do not. 
19 The advantage of using this measure is its high degree of comparability across countries and time, an 
important feature for our panel data set. On the other hand, measuring social security generosity by the amount 
of money paid to each retired person suffers from problems that include estimating the payments received on 
an individual basis as well as converting all the different country measures into a common unit of exchange. 
 13
20 These data are an improvement over previous measures used in the literature (e.g. Layard et al (1991)) and begin to 
address some of the criticisms raised by Atkinson and Micklewright (1991). I am grateful to David Grubb and Pascal 
Mariana at the OECD for providing me with this data set. 
where SUPPORT REVOLTictg is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when an 
individual, i, who lives in country, c, and year, t, agrees with the statement that “The entire 
way our society is organised must be radically changed by revolutionary action”. The superscript, g, 
refers to the fact that we consider the whole sample (in which case g=Whole Sample) but 
we also divide it on the bases of income (in which case g=Rich, Poor), of ideological 
inclination (in which case g=Right, Left) and of age (in which case g=Persons<40 years old, 
>40 years old). The vector MACROct refers to a set of variables aggregated at the country 
level that may also affect the support for revolt. These include the level of 
unemployment (Unemployment Rate) and GDP per capita (Output). Summary statistics are 
reported in Table 1.2. 
 
The vector MICROictg refers to a set of personal characteristics of the respondents that 
may affect an individual’s support for revolt, including their age, employment status, 
income, whether they are a manual worker, religious, etc. We also include ηcg which is a 
dummy variable for the cross-sectional units (i.e. countries), µtg which is a dummy 
variable for each year, λcgt which is a country-specific time trend and εictg which is an 
error term (i.i.d.). Robust standard errors are computed where we correct for potential 
heteroscedasticity and for potential correlation of the error term across observations 
that are contained within a cross sectional unit in any given year (see Moulton (1986)).  
 
4.  The Relation between Revolt and Social Insurance 
4. 1.  The Regression Evidence 
In Table 2 columns (1) to (5) present the results of the probit regressions using several 
different specifications of equation (8). In column (1) only the personal characteristics 
of each of the 200,547 individuals surveyed is regressed on their choice of whether not 
to support revolt. Marginal probabilities are reported. Being unemployed increases an 
individual’s support for revolt by 2.2 percentage points, being male by 1.5 percentage 
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points and being a manual worker by 1.2 percentage points. In contrast, a jump from 
the bottom to the second income quartile drops the support for revolt by 1 percentage 
point, a jump from the bottom to the third income quartile drops revolutionary support 
by 1.9 percentage points whereas a jump from the bottom to the top quartile drops it 
by 2.4 percentage points. Marital status is also important. Being married decreases the 
support for revolt by 1.1 percentage points and widowhood drops it by 0.7 percentage 
points. Separation has the opposite effect, increasing revolutionary support by 2.2 
percentage points. These effects remain stable across the subsequent regression 
specifications. 
 
In column (2) the generosity of Social Security is added as an explanatory variable. Its 
coefficient is negative and significant at the 5 per cent level. Its size, -0.294, indicates 
that a one standard deviation rise in Social Security generosity leads to a fall in the 
support for revolt of 1.4 percentage points (=-0.294*0.046). This is equal to 50 per cent 
of one standard deviation of the proportion of people who support revolt across the 
countries and years in the sample (=1.4/2.8). In column (3) the Unemployment Rate is 
included as an explanatory variable. This is important for two reasons. First, although 
the effect of being personally unemployed has already been included in the set of 
personal characteristics, the unemployment rate may also affect revolutionary support. 
This could be due to a ‘fear of unemployment’ effect. Second, the unemployment rate 
is a control for the state of the economy. The significance of the coefficient on Social 
Security now rises to 1 per cent. It also becomes more negative, equal to -0.493. Using 
this coefficient, a one standard deviation rise in Social Security leads to a fall in the 
support for revolt of 2.3 percentage points (=-0.493*0.046). This is equal to 82 per cent 
of one standard deviation of the proportion of people who support revolt across the 
countries and years in the sample (=2.3/2.8). The Unemployment Rate has a positive 
effect, significant at the 5 percent level, on the support for revolt even after controlling 
for whether or not the respondent has a job. A one standard deviation increase in the 
 15
Unemployment Rate is associated with a rise in the support for revolt equal to 1.1 
percentage points (=0.295*0.037). 
 
In column (4) Output, measured by GDP per capita at the price levels and exchange 
rates of 1985 and expressed in US dollars, is added as an additional control for the state 
of the economy. The coefficient on Social Security equals -0.494, almost the same as its 
value in column (3). Once Output is included, the coefficient on Unemployment remains 
positive but loses its significance. Output has a negative and insignificant effect on the 
support for revolt in this specification.21 
 
Column (5) repeats the specification in column (4) but adds whether or not an 
individual is religious as a control in the set of personal characteristics. The variable, 
Religious, takes the value of 1 when an individual identifies him or herself as belonging 
to a religion and 0 otherwise. The number of observations drops to 95,035 due to 
limited availability of this variable. The coefficient on Social Security increases (in 
absolute size) to -0.720. Now a one standard deviation rise in this variable leads to a fall 
in the support for revolt of 3.3 percentage points (=-0.720*0.046). This is equal to 1.2 
times one standard deviation of the proportion of people who support revolt across the 
countries and years in the sample (=3.3/2.8). 
Being religious lowers the probability that the average individual supports revolt by 5.3 
percentage points, significant at the 1 percent level. This is the biggest effect out of all 
the personal characteristics. It is, for example, 2.9 times the size of the effect of being 
unemployed (=5.3/1.8) and 2.2 times the size of the effect of jumping from the bottom 
to the top income quartile (=5.3/2.4). The coefficient on Religious allows us to calculate 
a marginal rate of substitution between the generosity of social security and religion, 
holding the support for revolt constant. If an individual loses religion it would require 
                                                 
21 The correlation coefficient between Output and Unemployment is equal to -0.21 (as expected by Okun’s Law). 
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an increase of 7.4 percentage points in Social Security to keep his level of revolutionary 
support the same (=0.053/0.720). This is equal to 1.6 times one standard deviation in 
the Social Security variable (=0.074/0.046). 
 
In Table 3 columns (1) to (5) test for whether the generosity of Unemployment Benefits, in 
addition to Social Security, affects the support for revolt. The individual controls in the 
following regressions are not reported because their coefficients change very little (they 
are often exactly the same as the ones reported in Table 4.1). In column (1) more 
generous Unemployment Benefits decrease support for revolt at the 1 percent level. The 
coefficient equals -0.187, implying that a one standard deviation increase in 
Unemployment Benefits decreases the support for revolt by 3.1 percentage points (-
0.187*0.166). This is equal to 1.1 times one standard deviation of the proportion of 
people who support revolt across the countries and years in the sample (=3.1/2.8). 
Columns (2) and (3) show that the effect is robust to the inclusion of the other 
macroeconomic variables, Unemployment Rate and Output. 
 
In columns (4) and (5) the Social Security variable is added. Both our measures of social 
insurance retain their signs, significance levels and magnitudes in these two regressions. 
In column (4) the Unemployment Rate has a positive effect on revolt, significant at the 2 
per cent level. However once we add a control for Output in column (5) it loses this 
effect. It is now more Output that reduces the support for revolt, significant at the 10 
percent level. A one standard deviation increase in Social Security is expected to lower 
support for revolt by 2.5 percentage points (=-0.554*0.046). A one standard deviation 
increase in Unemployment Benefits is expected to lower it by 4.2 percentage points (=-
0.254*0.166). These numbers represent 0.9 times and 1.5 times one standard deviation 
of the proportion of people who support revolt across the countries and years in the 
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The loss of significance of Unemployment in column (4) may be due to collinearity between these two variables. 
sample, respectively (=2.5/2.8 and 4.2/2.8). 
 
4. 2.  Discussion 
The significant and sizable negative coefficients on the Social Security and Unemployment 
Benefits variables in all the regressions explaining revolt in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that 
there is a role for Government transfers to ‘buy out’ threats to property rights. Of 
course the cost of this policy choice must be traded off against the cost of other 
choices available to Governments to quell revolt, such as spending on the military, 
national guard and police, or greater democratization 
 
The large negative coefficient on Religious in column (5) of Table 2, compared to the 
other personal characteristics, implies that more religiosity may also affect the 
Government’s optimal social welfare policy. If religion makes it more morally costly for 
an individual to exert effort on revolt then we could think of this as making the 
marginal cost of such effort, c, higher (in terms of the model in Section 2). This lowers 
the optimal level of rebel effort and could allow the Government to cut the level of 
social insurance without increasing the chances of revolt. When such a policy implies 
lower taxes for the higher income individuals, this result could help explain partisan 
policy differences. If right-wing parties weight the interests of the rich more highly than 
the poor compared to left-wing parties, then an optimal mix of policies for the right 
would include promoting a more religious society together with a less generous welfare 
state compared to the left.22 
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22 In Roemer’s (1998) formal model of political competition, the left party may be forced into more 
conservative policies to win power when voters have preferences given by a joint probability distribution over 
tax-religion policy space. This occurs because the median poor voter, who would support the left party to 
redistribute wealth from rich people if only money mattered, may not vote left once religion becomes a salient 
issue. 
 
5.  Further Checks and Tests on the Results 
5. 1.  Omitted Variable Bias 
There exists the possibility of an omitted variable in equation (8) being correlated with 
the included measures of social insurance. In terms of the model in Section 2, a drop in 
the cost of rebel effort due to an improvement in offensive technology would make it 
easier for people to challenge the existing allocation of property rights. If the 
Government responded by increasing the generosity of its transfers there would exist 
an omitted variable bias.  Consequently we may expect to observe a positive correlation 
between our measures of revolt and social insurance if the cost structure is changing 
and welfare policy is endogenous.23 Whether civil disorder induces changes in welfare 
policies is a subject of continuing debate in political science, starting with Piven and 
Cloward (1971). There are a number of related examples in the economics literature. In 
Grossman (1994) land reform that reduces inequality in the distribution of land 
ownership can be an optimal response to the threat of extralegal appropriation of the 
landed class’ income. North and Weingast (1989) describe how, after the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 in England, the winners (the Whigs) sought to redesign government 
institutions to avoid future revolt. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that political 
elites extended voting rights to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. 
 
To attempt to take account of this possibility, Instrumental Variables (I.V.) using Two 
Stage Least Squares estimation is employed. Table 4 re-estimates six of the previous 
specifications but where both measures of social insurance have been instrumented.24 
                                                 
23 This would mean that the estimations based on equation (8) are underestimating the true size of the negative 
effect of social insurance on revolt. For evidence on the endogeneity of social security, see Tabellini (1990), and 
for unemployment benefits, see Di Tella and MacCulloch (2000). 
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24 To do the Two Stage Least Squares regressions, we first ran probit regressions of the support for revolt on 
the set of personal characteristics listed in Table 4.1 separately for each country. The coefficients on the year 
dummies in these regressions were subsequently used as the dependent variable in 2SLS regressions in which 
Social Security and Unemployment Benefits were instrumented. 
Columns (1) and (2) repeat the specifications in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, but 
using the proportion of elderly people (over the age of 65) as an instrument for Social 
Security.25 In both these I.V. regressions, the coefficient on Social Security retains its 
significance at the 1 percent level and becomes more negative. The coefficient of the 
Unemployment Rate becomes both more positive and significant. Columns (3) and (4) 
repeat the specifications in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 but use the level and lag of 
openness (imports over GDP) as an instrument for Unemployment Benefits.26 The 
coefficient on benefits is now more negative than in the previous regressions, although 
the significance level drops to 10 per cent. 
 
The last two columns in Table 4 report more general specifications in which both Social 
Security and Unemployment Benefits are instrumented using the proportion of elderly 
people, openness and an index of the country-specific oil price (defined as the price of 
oil converted into local currency and standardized to equal 1 across all countries in 
1975). In column (5) the coefficient on Social Security is 1.3 times more negative than its 
value in the corresponding specification in column (4) of Table 3 (=0.702/0.548) 
whereas the coefficient on Unemployment Benefits is 1.9 times more negative 
(=0.384/0.207). The significance levels of these variables fall to 10 percent and 5 
percent, respectively. Although the Unemployment Rate has a positive effect on revolt in 
this regression, its significance disappears in the toughest test in column (6) where it 
becomes Output that has a negative effect (at the 10 per cent level). After controlling for 
both these variables, the coefficients on Social Security and Unemployment Benefits maintain 
their size although the larger standard error on the latter drops its significance below 
conventional levels. 
                                                 
25 Tabellini (1990) provides evidence that the generosity of social security is increasing with the proportion of 
the population over the age of 65 and with the level of (pre-tax) income inequality, as predicted by his positive 
theory. 
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26 The level of openness has been used as a proxy for an exogenous measure of risk to instrument the size of 
government in Rodrik (1998) and unemployment benefits in Di Tella and MacCulloch (2000). 
 5. 2.  Different Sub-groups and Adding More Controls 
In Table 5 columns (1) and (2) compare how the determinants of revolt differ 
depending on whether a person identifies himself as supporting a left versus a right-
wing political party. The differences appear striking. None of the four explanatory 
variables are significant in column (1) for the Right. On the other hand all except for 
Unemployment Rate are significant with the expected signs in column (2) for the Left. The 
coefficients on both Social Security and Unemployment Benefits are more negative for the 
Left than the Right, although it is not possible to statistically reject the null hypothesis 
that they are the same comparing across these two groups. Higher Output affects the 
support for revolt more negatively for the Left than the Right, at the 6 per cent level of 
significance. 
 
Columns (3) and (4) compare how the determinants of revolt differ depending on 
whether a person is Rich (i.e. lies in the top half on the income distribution) or is Poor 
(i.e. lies in the bottom half). Whereas higher Output lowers the support for revolt 
amongst the Poor at the 5 per cent level, the effect is not significant for the Rich. The 
social insurance variables both have negative coefficients, at the 1 per cent level of 
significance, for the two income groups. There is some (weak) evidence that 
Unemployment Benefits reduce the support for revolt more for the Poor than the Rich, 
whereas Social Security reduces it more for the Rich than the Poor. 
 
As a further test of the robustness of the results, controls for three additional variables 
are included in columns (5) and (6). Government Consumption is added in column (5) to 
check that it is not higher Government spending on goods and services, rather than 
transfer payments, driving the results. The coefficient on Government Consumption is 
negative but insignificant whereas the ones on Social Security and Unemployment Benefits 
have similar size and significance levels to the comparable specification in column (5) 
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of Table 3. 
 
In column (6) two more variables are added, Right Wing and Military. The former 
measures the extent to which the political preferences in a country lean towards the 
right. It is similar to the indices used by political scientists to indicate the left/right 
position of Government, and is constructed in two steps (see, for example, Hicks and 
Swank (1992)). In the first step, we collect the number of votes received by each party 
participating in cabinet and express them as a percentage of the total votes received by 
all parties with cabinet representation. In the second step, this percentage of support is 
multiplied by a left/right political scale (from Castles and Mair (1984)) and summed 
across all parties to give a continuous variable. Military is defined as spending on the 
military as a fraction of GDP. 
 
The reason for including Right Wing is the possibility that a set of policies may be 
undertaken by a partisan political party that affect the support for revolt, in addition to 
ones relating to the level of transfers to the elderly and the unemployed. For example, a 
party may wish to cut transfers but also reform labor market flexibility, making it easier 
to hire and fire workers. Including Right Wing is a way to control for the effect of these 
additional policies in a single variable. The coefficient on Right Wing is positive but not 
significant at conventional levels.27 Since the degree of repression is also a possible 
determinant of revolt a proxy, Military, was also included in this regression.28 It has a 
                                                 
27 The results change slightly if Right Wing is measured as a dummy variable taking the value 1 when a party 
categorized by political scientists as being “right-wing” is in power (from Alesina and Roubini (1992)). With this 
alternative definition, the coefficient is positive and significant at the 10 percent level but the size of the effect is 
small. A change from a left to a right party adds 0.5 percentage points onto revolutionary support, or 18 
percent of one standard deviation of the proportion of people supporting revolt across the countries and years 
in the sample. 
28 In Grossman’s (1991) model of insurrection, more soldiers decrease the amount of time spent on 
insurrection and consequently its probability of success. In the political science literature, military repression has 
been argued to have ambiguous effects on rebellion (see, inter alia, Tilly (1978), Lichbach (1987), Gurr and 
Moore (1997)). 
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negative but insignificant effect on the support for revolt. Social Security and 
Unemployment Benefits again retain the size and significance of their coefficients. Further 
specifications were also tried, including adding the inflation rate, which had a positive 
but insignificant effect on revolt. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The security of property rights lies at the heart of market economies. However 
obtaining precise estimates of the determinants of the security of property rights has 
proved difficult. The recent release of large-scale data sets that survey levels of support 
for revolt in nations has made this task easier. In particular they now allow us to answer 
some of the oldest questions in this field. Does the level of social insurance reduce the 
chance of revolt? Is religion the opium of the masses? 
 
This paper first presents examples in a simple model of revolt that show us how the 
welfare state may be used as a particularly powerful policy instrument for crowding out 
revolutionary efforts in society. The extent of the crowding out becomes an important 
empirical question and forms the subsequent focus of the paper. The findings are: 
 
1. Controlling for the personal characteristics of the respondents, country fixed effects, 
year dummies and country-specific time trends, less people support revolt when the 
generosity of either the elderly person’s social security or unemployment benefits 
increases. These effects are both significant at the 1 percent level and are of sizeable 
magnitude. A one standard deviation increase in Social Security (equivalent to 
increasing spending on the elderly as a fraction of GDP by 4.6 percentage points) 
lowers the support for revolt by 2.5 percentage points. A one standard deviation 
increase in Unemployment Benefits (equivalent to increasing the replacement rate by 
16.6 percentage points) lowers the support for revolt by 4.2 percentage points. 
These numbers represent 0.9 times and 1.5 times one standard deviation of the 
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proportion of people who support revolt across the countries and years in the 
sample, respectively. 
 
2. The negative effects of social insurance on revolt are concentrated in the group of 
individuals identifying themselves as supporting left political parties, but not right 
parties. 
 
3. The personal characteristic with the largest (absolute) size of effect on revolt is 
being religious. It lowers the chance a person wants revolt by 5.3 percentage points. 
Being unemployed, a manual worker or male increases revolutionary support. As 
one goes up the income quartiles, there is a monotonically decreasing chance of a 
person wanting revolt. 
 
As a result the optimal design of the welfare state should probably take account of its 
potential to ‘buy out’ revolt. It seems that Otto von Bismark got it right in 1889 when 
he set up the first social security system to pacify the left-wingers of his times. The 
results also suggest that a less religious nation may need to offer a more generous level 
of social insurance in order to keep the level of support for revolt constant. This could 
help explain partisan divisions in which political parties that promote a smaller welfare 
state sometimes also encourage more religious values. Karl Marx’s famous quote from 
1844 on religion being the opium of the masses has a strong empirical basis. 
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Table 1.1 
Support for Revolution: 12 Countries, 1976 to 1990. 
Support for All Unemploye
d 
Male Manual 
Workers 
Religious 
Persons 
Revolt?      
      
Yes 6.0 9.9 6.8 7.4 5.0 
      
No 94.0 90.1 93.2 92.6 95.0 
      
 
 
 
 Partisan Support Income Quartiles 
                 
Support Left Right      1st 2nd      3rd    4th 
For Revolt?   (Lowest)   (Highest) 
       
Yes 7.9 3.2 6.7 6.6 5.7 5.2 
       
No 92.1 96.8 93.3 93.4 94.3 94.8 
       
Note: Based on 200,547 observations. All numbers are expressed as percentages. 
 
 
 
Table 1.2 
Summary Statistics 
      
Variable Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
      
SUPPORT REVOLT 200,547 0.060 0.237 0 1 
SOCIAL SECURITY 154 0.180 0.046 0.092 0.288 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 154 0.087 0.037 0.003 0.220 
OUTPUT 154 7,744 2,377 2,145 12,184 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 143 0.297 0.166 0.004 0.562 
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Table 2 
The Effect of Social Security and Personal Characteristics on Support for Revolt: 12 Countries, 1976-90. 
Dependent Var.: Support for Revolt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Social Security  -0.294* -0.493** -0.494** -0.720** 
  (0.130) (0.145) (0.138) (0.294) 
Unemployment Rate   0.295* 0.197 0.347 
   (0.142) (0.199) (0.305) 
Output   -1.6e-5 -1.3e-5 
   (1.4e-5) (1.8e-5) 
Religious    -0.053** 
    (0.014)
Unemployed 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.018** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Male 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Self employed 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Manual Worker 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Income Quartile:  Second -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
                Third -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.018** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
                Fourth (highest) -0.024** -0.024** -0.024** -0.024** -0.024** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Age -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*
 (2.0e-4) (2.0e-4) (1.9e-4) (1.9e-4) (3.8e-4) 
Age Squared 1.7e-6 1.8e-6 1.8e-6 1.8e-6 4.6e-6 
 (1.9e-6) (2.0e-6) (1.9e-6) (1.9e-6) (4.4e-6) 
Education:  ≥ 15 years &  ≤ 18 years -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
                   > 18 years 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Marital Status:  Married -0.011** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
                        Divorced 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
           Separated 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.034** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
           Widowed -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Number of children:  1 -4.4e-4 -4.0e-4 -4.8e-4 -4.5e-4 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
                                  2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 4.8e-4 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
                                 ≥3 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -8.7e-5 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Retired -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Home 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
School 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.067 
Observations 200,547 200,547 200,547 200,547 95,035
Notes: [1] Regressions are Probits. [2] Marginal Probabilities (robust standard errors) reported. [3] Bold-face is 
significant at 10 percent level; Single-starred bold at 5 per cent level; Double-starred bold at 1 percent level
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Table 3 
The Effect of Unemployment Benefits as well as Social Security 
on the Support for Revolt: 12 Countries, 1976 to 1990. 
Dep. Var.: Support for Revolt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Social Security    -0.548** -0.554** 
    (0.117) (0.099) 
     
Unemployment Benefits -0.187** -0.189** -0.234** -0.207** -0.254** 
 (0.072) (0.070) (0.072) (0.070) (0.068) 
     
Unemployment Rate  0.103 -0.035 0.321* 0.182
  (0.113) (0.165) (0.132) (0.174) 
     
Output   -2.2e-5  -2.3e-5
   (1.6e-5)  (1.3e-5)
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
     
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
     
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
     
Country Specific Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
     
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.049
Observations 195,269 195,269 195,269 195,269 195,269
Notes: [1] All the regressions are Probits. [2] Marginal Probabilities (robust standard errors) are 
reported. [3] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent level; Single-starred bold-face at the 5 
per cent level; Double-starred bold face at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 4 
The Effect of Social Security and Unemployment Benefits on the Support for 
Revolt using Instrumental Variables Estimation: 12 Countries, 1976 to 1990. 
Dep. Var.: Support for Revolt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     
Social Security -1.581** -1.480**  -0.702 -0.729 
 (0.538) (0.562)  (0.367) (0.419) 
     
Unemployment Benefits  -0.504 -0.817 -0.384* -0.335 
  (0.310) (0.482) (0.195) (0.264)
     
Unemployment Rate 0.742** 0.553** 0.060 -0.214 0.361 0.178
 (0.274) (0.285) (0.106) (0.186) (0.195) (0.247)
     
Output  -2.0e-5 -4.1e-5  -2.6e-5 
  (1.1e-5) (2.2e-5)  (1.5e-5) 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
     
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
     
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
     
Country Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
     
R2 0.446 0.489 0.470 0.264 0.587 0.635
Observations1 200,547 200,547 195,269 195,269 195,269 195,269 
Notes: [1] All regressions are Two Stage Least Squares. To do them, we first ran probit regressions 
of the support for revolt on the set of personal characteristics listed in Table 4.1 separately for 
each country. The coefficients on the year dummies in these regressions were subsequently used as 
the dependent variable in 2SLS regressions in which Social Security and Unemployment Benefits were 
instrumented. [2] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent level; Single-starred bold-face at 
the 5 per cent level; Double-starred bold face at the 1 percent level. [3] Columns (1) and (2) use 
the proportion of elderly people in the population (≥65 years) as an instrument; Columns (3) and 
(4) use the level and lag of openness as instruments; Columns (5) and (6) use the levels and lags of 
the proportion of elderly people and openness, as well as the lagged level of the country-specific 
price of oil to instrument Social Security Generosity and Unemployment Benefits. 
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Table 5 
The Effect of Social Security and Unemployment Benefits on the Support for 
Revolt: Differences Across Sub-groups and Adding More Controls: 12 Countries, 
1976 to 1990. 
 Right Left Rich Poor All All
Dep. Var.: Support for Revolt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
    
Social Security -0.181 -0.535** -0.642** -0.446** -0.550** -0.493** 
 (0.123) (0.120) (0.109) (0.126) (0.096) (0.105) 
    
Unemployment Benefits -0.090 -0.270** -0.176** -0.337** -0.247** -0.195** 
 (0.076) (0.101) (0.060) (0.105) (0.079) (0.075) 
    
Unemployment Rate -0.003 0.022 0.290 0.052 0.179 0.211 
 (0.125) (0.162) (0.207) 0.160 (0.173) (0.152) 
    
Output 1.3e-6 -5.8e-5** -1.1e-5 -3.5e-5* -2.4e-5* -1.5e-5 
 (1.4e-5) (1.5e-5) (1.2e-5) (1.5e-5) (1.2e-5) (1.3e-5)
    
Government Consumption   -0.061 0.079 
   (0.310) (0.389) 
    
Right Wing    1.4e-3 
    (9.8e-4)
    
Military    -0.329
    (0.473) 
    
    
    
    
Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
Country Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.062 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.049 
Observations 58,929 73,426 101,202 94,067 195,269 165,880 
Notes: [1] All the regressions are Probits. [2] Marginal Probabilities (robust standard errors) are 
reported. [3] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent level; Single-starred bold-face at the 5 
per cent level; Double-starred bold face at the 1 percent level. 
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Appendix: Data Definitions and Survey Descriptions 
 
Data Definitions 
 
SUPPORT FOR REVOLT? A dummy variable that equals 1 when the survey 
respondent answers that “The entire way our society is organised must be radically 
changed by revolutionary action”, and equals 0 when the respondent answers that 
either “Our society must be gradually improved by reforms” or “Our present society must 
be valiantly defended against all subversive forces” (Euro-Barometer Survey). 
 
SOCIAL SECURITY: These are transfers to primarily the elderly (pensions) but 
also include sickness, social assistance grants, family allowances and unfunded 
employee welfare benefits paid by general Government, measured as a 
fraction of GDP (OECD Historic Statistics). 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS: Index of (pre-tax) unemployment insurance 
benefit entitlements divided by the corresponding wage (calculated for odd-
numbered years). This summary measure estimates the situation of a 
representative individual. It calculates the unweighted mean of 18 numbers 
based on all combinations of the following scenarios: (i) three unemployment 
durations (for persons with a long record of previous employment); the first 
year, the second and third years, and the fourth and fifth years of 
unemployment. (ii) three family and income situations: a single person, a 
married person with a dependent spouse, and a married person with a spouse 
in work. (iii) two different levels of previous earnings: average earnings and 
two-thirds of average earnings (OECD Jobs Study (1994)). 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: The unemployment rate (CEP OECD Data Set). 
 
OUTPUT: Real GDP per capita at 1985 price levels and exchange rates in U.S. 
dollars (OECD). 
 
RELIGIOUS: A dummy variable that equals 1 when the survey respondent answers 
yes to the question “Do you regard yourself as belonging to a religion? If so, which of 
them”. The specific categories of religion listed in the remainder of the 
question are “1. Catholic  2. Protestant (established Church); Church of England 
(Britain); Church of Ireland (Ireland, Northern Ireland)  3. Gereformeerd (Netherlands); 
Church of Scotland (Britain)  4. Non-Conformist, free church (Britain)  5. Other  6. 
None  7. Greek Orthodox” (Euro-Barometer Survey). 
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LEFT/RIGHT: This classification uses the survey question which asks respondents: 
“If an election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?”. Political 
scientists subsequently classified the chosen parties into left and right (Euro-
Barometer Survey). 
 
RICH/POOR: A respondent is classified as “Rich” if they belong to the top two 
income quartiles and “Poor” otherwise. The quartiles are based on the 
person’s position in their country each year. 
 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION: Government final consumption expenditure 
as a faction of GDP (CEP-OECD Data Set). 
 
RIGHT WING: Two definitions are used: (i) An index of left/right political party 
strength equal to the sum of the number of votes received by each party 
participating in cabinet expressed as a percentage of total votes received by all 
parties with cabinet representation, multiplied by a left/right political scale 
constructed by political scientists. Votes are from Mackie and Rose, The 
International Almanac of Electoral History (1982), cabinet composition from The 
Europa Yearbook (1969-89) and left/right scale from Castles and Mair (1984). 
(ii) A dummy variable equal to 1 when a party categorized by political 
scientists as being “right” is in power. The base category is “left” (see Alesina 
and Roubini (1992)). 
 
MILITARY: Total military expenditures as a fraction of GDP (Statistical Abstract of 
the United States and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers). 
 
OPENNESS: Total Imports as a fraction of GDP (CEP OECD Data Set). 
 
OIL: An index of the country specific price of oil, obtained by converting the price 
of oil in US dollars into the local currency and standardizing to equal 1 across 
all countries in 1975. 
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Survey Descriptions 
 
The Euro-Barometer Survey Series (1976-1990) 
The Euro-Barometer Surveys used in this paper were conducted by various research 
firms operated within the European Union (E.U.) countries under the direction of 
the European Commission. Either a nationwide multi-stage probability sample or a 
nationwide stratified quota sample of persons aged 15 and over was selected in each 
of the E.U. countries. The cumulative data file used contains 36 attitudinal, 21 
demographic and 10 analysis variables selected from the European Communities 
Studies (1970-1973) and Euro-Barometers (3-38). 
 
Data for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom were available for the full sample period that 
was used (1976-1990) whereas data were only available from 1980 to 1990 for 
Greece and from 1985 to 1990 for both Spain and Portugal. The number of 
observations in our sample was 18993 for Belgium, 19956 for Britain, 21249 for 
Denmark, 22366 for France, 21247 for West Germany, 15639 for Greece, 15667 for 
Ireland, 24476 for Italy, 5278 for Luxembourg, 21873 for The Netherlands, 7218 for 
Portugal and 6585 for Spain. 
 
The Combined World Values Survey (1981, 1990) 
The Combined World Values Survey is produced by the Institute for Social 
Research, Ann Arbor, MI, USA. Both national random and quota sampling were 
used. All of the surveys were carried out through face-to-face interviews, with a 
sampling universe consisting of all adult citizens, aged 18 and older, across 45 
societies around the world. In total there were 379 attitudinal, demographic and 
analysis variables collected. 
 
Data for The United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Argentina, France, Britain, West 
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, South Africa, 
Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Iceland and Finland were available for both 1980 and 
1990. Data for China, Russia, Brazil, Slovenia, Portugal, Poland, Nigeria, Chile, 
India, Czech-Slovak, East Germany, Bulgaria, Austria, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
were only available for 1990. Australia was only available for 1980. The number of 
observations for which data were available for the purposes of the present paper 
was 3737 for The United States, 2703 for Canada, 2911 for Mexico, 1336 for Japan, 
1792 for Argentina, 2057 for France, 2508 for Britain, 3019 for West Germany, 
3190 for Italy, 2021 for The Netherlands, 1965 for Denmark, 3297 for Belgium, 
5691 for Spain, 2054 for Ireland, 3754 for South Africa, 1153 for Australia, 887 for 
Hungary, 2324 for Norway, 1790 for Sweden, 1595 for Iceland, 532 for Finland, 958 
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for China, 1703 for Russia, 1725 for Brazil, 769 for Slovenia, 989 for Portugal, 855 
for Poland, 946 for Nigeria, 1378 for Chile, 2321 for India, 1391 for Czech-Slovak, 
1280 for East Germany, 928 for Bulgaria, 1288 for Austria, 932 for Lithuania, 765 
for Latvia and 890 for Estonia. 
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